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Language as the Key 
to the Epistemological Labyrinth




‘Languages are the measure of mankind’s ideas’, declared Anne Robert 
Jacques Turgot (1727–1781) in his second discourse at the Sorbonne in 1750, 
before abandoning an ecclesiastical career for administrative service (Turgot 
1913: 223). Though he is remembered today mainly for his writings on political 
economy, epistemological and linguistic questions played a major role in the 
development of Turgot’s philosophy. In an early list of works to be composed, 
he planned — among economic, political, and poetic endeavors — to write 
treatises on the origin of language, human knowledge, etymology, and ‘an anal-
ysis of sensations and of language, from which [are derived] the principles of 
logic and universal metaphysics’ (ibid., 115–116). This unaccomplished project 
reflects the broad interest of contemporary French authors in Locke’s theory 
of representation and its further development by Etienne Bonnot de Condillac 
(1714–1780) in his Essai sur l’origine des connoissances humaines (1746). Ac-
cording to Condillac, reasoning — as well as any higher activity of the human 
mind — depended on the use of signs. Since knowledge and language were 
considered by Condillac to be closely related to one another, an inquiry into 
* Apart from the presentation at the annual colloquium of Studienkreis ‘Geschichte der 
Sprachwissenschaft’ (Humboldt-Universität, Berlin, March 2004), an abridged version of 
this paper was read at the Eleventh Quadrennial Conference on the Enlightenment of the 
International Society for Eighteenth-Century Studies (University of California, Los Angeles, 
August 2003). I am grateful to those who took part in the discussions following my presen-
tations for their helpful and illuminating suggestions. David Cram, Gerda Haßler, Joseph 
Mali, Edward Nye, John Robertson, and three anonymous readers have contributed valuable 
remarks on earlier versions of this paper. 
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the origin of knowledge inevitably became an investigation of the manner in 
which arbitrary signs were acquired, a search for the origin of language. Turgot 
enthusiastically embarked on this quest.
I would like to trace two phases in Turgot’s works concerning language and 
representation. At first, around 1750, he assumed a firm if hypothetical cor-
respondence between objects, ideas, and their representation in language. This 
assumption, manifest in Turgot’s critiques of Berkeley and Maupertuis, was 
rooted in a staunch belief in human ability to perceive external reality in a sat-
isfactory manner. Turgot’s initial views concerning language, perception, and 
external reality are presented in the first part of this article. Several years after-
wards, however, Turgot cast doubt on the adequacy of human cognition and its 
correspondence to external reality. In the entries he contributed to volume six 
of the Encyclopédie (1756), Turgot admitted that definitions were sometimes 
impossible, generalization involved contradiction, and human perception was 
misleading. While Turgot was revising his epistemological views, aided by lin-
guistic investigations, some of the leading philosophes debated similar issues. 
Both Condillac and Denis Diderot (1713–1782) seriously considered the chal-
lenges Berkeley’s immaterialism had set for Lockean empiricism, thereby ques-
tioning or altering their own theories of knowledge. The apparent modification 
Turgot’s convictions underwent during the 1750s is traced in the second sec-
tion of the article; its third part is devoted to the context in which this change 
took place. 
2. Turgot’s critiques of Maupertuis and Berkeley (1750)
Turgot’s early belief in the firmness of human perception of external ob-
jects is discernible in his remarks on works by two authors who employed lin-
guistic inquiries in order to question the correspondence between reality and 
the perceiving mind: Réflexions philosophiques sur l’origine des langues et la 
signification des mots by Pierre Louis Moreau de Maupertuis (1698–1759)1 and 
the immaterialist system of George Berkeley (1685–1753).2 
1. The Réflexions were usually regarded as dating from 1748, but Maupertuis’s biographer 
David Beeson (1987) suggests they were written as early as 1740.
2. Particularly his Treatise Concerning the Principles of Human Knowledge (1710) and Three 
Dialogues between Hylas and Philonous (1713), in Berkeley (2000: 71–251).
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2.1 Ridiculing Maupertuis’s doubts 
Maupertuis tried to reconstruct man’s first ideas by supposing himself in 
an imagined primordial situation, when his mind was ‘empty of ideas’ and as-
saulted by all kinds of sensations. For Maupertuis, it was precisely the use of 
signs in the analysis of perceptions that raised the question of how adequate-
ly we are acquainted with external reality: the linguistic analysis of percep-
tions might be performed in various manners, thereby leading our knowledge 
through diverse trajectories. Different peoples might have incommensurable 
‘planes of ideas’, determined not by their initial perceptions but by the ways 
in which these were linguistically analyzed. This contention led Maupertuis to 
doubt the whole concept of existence, claiming that a proposition such as ‘there 
is a tree’ consisted merely of the repeated notions ‘I saw a tree’, ‘I returned to 
the same place and saw the tree’, and the assumption that ‘every time I arrive 
there I should see a tree’. Thus, existence amounts to a mere conglomerate of 
perceptions that do not necessarily resemble their causes or external objects. 
Referring to the problem of sensualist epistemology (an ultimate incertitude 
concerning the causes of sensations), Maupertuis assumed there is a reason for 
the sequences of human perceptions, but since this reason is neither similar to 
our sense data nor resembles them, we should not try to penetrate the realm of 
causes (Maupertuis 1971 [1740/48]: 40–44). 
Turgot’s passionate critique of Maupertuis’s short treatise is to be found 
in his Remarques critiques sur les réflexions philosophiques de Maupertuis sur 
l’origine des langues et la signification des mots, written in 1750. Adhering to the 
Enlightenment principle of the universality of human capacities, which Mau-
pertuis himself seemed to share, Turgot dismissed the assertion of different 
ways of signification and perceptual analysis. According to Turgot, all human 
beings perceive objects in the same manner, external objects are supposed to 
exist as causes of perceptions, and sensations are everywhere identical, consti-
tuting the basis of similar ideas. Throughout Turgot’s remarks on Maupertuis’s 
treatise, his assurance of the existence of external bodies seems more of a com-
mon-sense belief than a rigorously defended philosophical view:
Quant à la raison pourquoi l’idée, je vois un arbre (art. XXIX de Maupertuis) 
succède à celle-ci, je vais dans un endroit où j’ai vu un arbre, elle est simple, 
c’est que l’arbre y est et Maupertuis me fait rire (1971 [1750]: 83).3 
3. Original emphasis, as in all following quotations.
348 Avi S. Lifschitz
One of the points taken more seriously by Turgot was Maupertuis’s method of 
reconstructing the origin of language and ideas. Unlike Maupertuis, who began 
his reconstruction by ascribing signs to entire perceptions rather than to par-
ticular objects (‘I see a tree’ and not merely ‘a tree’), Turgot asserted that at the 
first stage of cognition we are not aware of the process of perception. Initially, 
we only grasp objects: to gain consciousness of ourselves perceiving we must 
already have ideas and signs. Self-awareness, the retour sur soi, presupposes at 
least some rudiments of language (ibid., 65–66). This distinction served Turgot 
later in his critique of Maupertuis’s doubts concerning external reality. Turgot 
presupposed the ‘being’ (être) of objects, easily revealed once single items are 
denoted instead of whole perceptions, as Maupertuis suggested. According to 
Turgot’s Remarques, perceptions of specific objects naturally lead us to assume 
the existence of their external causes (p. 71). 
[…] Si les hommes avaient toujours considéré leurs perceptions, comme fait 
ici Maupertuis, indépendamment de leurs objets, ils n’auraient jamais eu l’idée 
de substance ou plutôt, elle se serait confondue avec le sentiment de leurs ex-
istence propre; mais naturellement portés à supposer hors d’eux-mêmes un 
objet de leurs perception, tous leurs sens et tous les raisonnements qu’ils ont 
pu faire sur leurs sens, les ont conduits à la même opinion.4
Turgot declares it unnecessary to prove this point, and further claims that the 
fact we have different perceptions of an object under various circumstances 
also proves there must be an external item to which all these modifications 
relate. Though he admits we cannot know what is precisely the common sub-
stance of objects without access to the nature of things, Turgot is sure that such 
a substance exists as a common feature of external bodies, constituting their 
cause (ibid.): 
Alors, en supposant l’existence des objets hors de nous, l’on considère l’objet 
total, et l’on ne saurait se tromper en répondant que c’est une substance, car le 
mot de substance est un nom que les hommes ont donné à l’objet existant hors 
d’eux auquel se rapportent leurs différentes perceptions. 
As for languages, they do differ from each other due to the circumstances in 
which things were first encountered and the use of what Turgot calls ‘crude 
metaphors’; there are no distinct ‘planes of ideas’, however, and representation 
4. In Turgot’s articles of 1756, reviewed below, he asserts precisely what he fears here: the 
notion of the existence of external objects cannot be distinguished from that of the perceiv-
ing self. 
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adequately depicts external reality. Maupertuis’s extension of his doubt, initial-
ly based on linguistic analysis, to the permanence of the self and the duration 
of time prompted Turgot to issue a harsh verdict (p. 83): 
Pour moi, je ne sais pas goûter un pareil pyrrhonisme et il annonce, ou un 
fou, ou un jeu d’esprit assez déplacé pour quiconque n’est plus étudiant en 
métaphysique. 
2.2 Tackling Berkeley’s immaterialism
A similar attitude is exhibited in Turgot’s letters on Berkeley’s philosophi-
cal system, dating from the same year (1750) and probably written shortly af-
ter his critique of Maupertuis. Facing the crucial problem at stake — human 
ignorance of the manner in which perceptions correspond to their external 
causes — Turgot endorses a form of critical realism. The existence of external 
objects must be confirmed, according to Turgot, since they constitute causes of 
different data perceived by various senses and because they are represented by 
a similar order of perceptions in different minds. 
Tout le rapport des moyens à leur fin, qui paraît si évidemment dans toute la 
nature, disparaîtrait, si tout n’etait qu’une suite d’idées. En un mot, tout est 
expliqué en supposant l’existence des corps; tout est obscur — et bizarre — en 
la niant. Combien de sensations désagréables surtout qui nous avertissent des 
dangers de notre corps, et qui ne seraient de la part de Dieu qu’un jeu cruel, 
si les corps n’existaient pas! Voilà donc les objets extérieurs démontrés à nous 
existants. (Turgot 1913 [1750]: 190)5
Turgot treats Berkeley’s immaterialist system by predominantly relying upon 
common sense as a shelter from psychology-dependent reality. He does not 
hold that external objects perfectly resemble our ideas of them, but as in his 
critique of Maupertuis, he is assured that they exist outside the perceiving 
mind (p. 187). 
Or, quelle absurdité d’imaginer que des suppositions toutes chimériques 
puissent mener à des conclusions toutes vérifiées par l’expérience […] 
J’ajoute: si les corps n’existent point, la physique est anéantie; et combien 
de choses démontrées en physique?
5. Richard Popkin maintains that Turgot’s discussion of Berkeley is “polite, considered, 
measured and responsible” compared to some of his nastier critics in England and France 
(1997: 180). The comparison to other critics notwithstanding, among Turgot’s own works 
there is a contrast between his attitude towards Berkeley in 1750 and the modified view of 
his Encyclopédie articles.
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Finally, the conclusion of Turgot’s letters on Berkeley could hardly be more 
resolute than the statement “En voilà assez pour voir le ridicule du système” 
(p. 193).
In both his critiques of Maupertuis and Berkeley, Turgot relied heavily and 
almost solely on a somewhat circular argument, assuming the existence of what 
was yet to be proven (or at least deemed so by Berkeley and Maupertuis). Like 
other contemporary critics of Berkeley, Turgot took the Irish philosopher’s 
works to stand for a reduction of empiricism ad absurdum, misrepresenting 
Berkeley’s assertion that sensible objects are the real and only existing things, 
even if their essence is dependent upon a perceiving spirit or God; it is the 
traditional distinction between external bodies as obscure causes of percep-
tions and their ‘ideas’ or ‘representations’ in the mind that Berkeley tried to do 
away with.6 
It is interesting to note that unlike his critique of Maupertuis, Turgot’s re-
view of Berkeley’s system concerns only its epistemological and metaphysical 
features, with no regard to their linguistic implications. This lack of reference 
to Berkeley’s remarks on language is all the more striking since Berkeley com-
bined his critique of language with his immaterialist system in the introduction 
to the Principles of Human Knowledge (1710), launching a vehement attack on 
the notion of abstract ideas and their alleged representation by general terms.7 
This close relationship between abstraction in language and metaphysics was 
to occupy Turgot later, when he was required to define an abstract term such 
as ‘existence’.
3. Turgot’s Encyclopédie entries (1756)
The articles Turgot contributed to Diderot’s and d’Alembert’s Encyclopédie, 
published in volumes six (1756) and seven (1757), testify to the wide scope of 
his interests (ranging from Expansibilité to Foire). Two of them, Existence and 
Étymologie (1756), present a clear departure from Turgot’s earlier views con-
cerning perception and representation. 
6. See Michael Ayers’s introduction to Berkeley (2000: xxiv–xxxi) and Bracken (1965: 
6–38).
7. On Berkeley’s theory of language and his (perhaps misguided) critique of Locke, see 
Coseriu (2003: 227–236). 
 Language as the Key to the Epistemological Labyrinth 351
3.1 The psychological history of ‘existence’
In the article Existence, Turgot treads a Lockean path by trying to explain 
the notion through a search for its origin. The starting point here is not reality 
and external objects, but the perceiving self — rather similarly to Maupertuis’s 
own reconstruction of the genesis of his ideas. Turgot traces the different kinds 
of human sensations (those related to present things, to objects which are not 
directly present, and to the self). All three sorts of sensations are rooted in self-
consciousness; Turgot explains that we convey the consciousness of the self 
onto external objects, thus making their existence stem from, or depend on 
human self-perception. Unlike his earlier claims, Turgot realizes in 1756 that 
the same degree of existence may be attributed to the objects of sensations and 
to abstract notions of the imagination:
[…] Nous transportons en quelque sorte cette conscience du moi sur les ob-
jets extérieurs, par une espèce d’assimilation vague, démentie aussitôt par la 
séparation de tout ce qui concerne le moi, mais qui ne suffit pas moins pour 
devenir le fondement d’une abstraction ou d’un signe commun, et pour être 
l’objet de nos jugements. 
 Le concept de l’existence est donc le même dans un sens, soit que l’esprit 
ne l’attache qu’aux objets de la sensation, soit qu’il l’étende sur les objets que 
l’imagination lui présente avec des relations de distance ou d’activité, puisqu’il 
est toujours primitivement renfermé dans la conscience même du moi généra-
lisé plus ou moins. (1913 [1756]: 525)
It is worth recalling here Turgot’s early critique, where he reprimanded Mau-
pertuis for claiming that we can bestow reality on objects by repeatedly per-
ceiving them. In 1750 Turgot rhetorically wondered what Maupertuis intended 
by his expression ‘to bestow more reality’ on something (donner plus de réalité), 
and dismissed it as an obscure term grounded in sophistry.8 Yet in his Ency-
clopédie article Turgot employs the same means to explain how we form the 
concept of existence. According to Turgot, if we further try to explain the word 
‘existence’ (or the actual existence of external objects) as separate from us, we 
inevitably face a deadlock. In a peculiar confession within such an explanatory 
entry, Turgot admits the impossibility of any definition of existence as sepa-
rated from self-consciousness (p. 531): 
Alors la notion d’existence sera aussi abstraite qu’elle peut l’être, et n’aura d’autre 
signe que le mot même existence; ce mot ne répondra, comme on le voit, à 
8. “Qu’entend Maupertuis par ces mots ‘donner plus de réalité’. A l’aide de cette équivoque 
il fait bien des sophismes” (1971 [1750]: 77). 
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aucune idée ni des sens, ni de l’imagination, si ce n’est à la conscience du moi, 
généralisée, et séparée de tout ce qui caractérise non seulement le moi, mais 
même tous les objets auxquels elle a pu être transportée par abstraction. Je sais 
bien que cette généralisation renferme une vraie contradiction, mais toutes les 
abstractions sont dans le même cas, et c’est pour cela que leur généralité n’est 
jamais que dans les signes et non dans les choses. La notion d’existence n’étant 
composée d’aucune autre idée particulière que de la conscience même du moi, 
qui est nécessairement une idée simple, étant d’ailleurs applicable à tous les 
êtres sans exception, ce mot ne peut être, à proprement parler, défini et il suffit 
de montrer par quels degrés la notion qu’il désigne a pu se former.
Since the existence of external objects is fundamentally grounded in human 
self-consciousness, Turgot does not hesitate to consider the implications he 
ridiculed in his critique of Maupertuis. The order of sensations and that of 
things might constitute ‘two separate universes’; daily experience may grant us 
no guarantee against false judgements concerning the existence of objects. His 
bold conclusion thoroughly differs from his views of 1750 (p. 536).
Je ne m’arrêterai pas à réfuter les conséquences qu’on voudrait tirer de l’in-
clination que nous avons à croire à l’existence des corps malgré tous les rai-
sonnements métaphysiques: nous avons la même inclination à répandre nos 
sensations sur la surface des objets extérieurs, et tout le monde sait que l’ha-
bitude suffit pour nous rendre les jugements les plus faux presque naturels. 
Concluons qu’aucune sensation ne peut immédiatement, et par elle-même, 
nous assurer de l’existence d’aucun corps.
There is, however, one last refuge from immaterialism, a way out of ‘the prison 
to which nature confines us, isolated and cut off ’ (ibid.). As Berkeley had point-
ed out, the way out of the impasse cannot be found within the sensualist system 
itself. Trying to solve this problem, Turgot chooses to follow another direction 
than Berkeley’s9 and turns to the assistance of probable causality. He explains 
that we are faced with two different orders, the one comprised of sensations 
and the other of their unknown causes. The only way to mediate between these 
orders is by employing the Newtonian scientific method, treating sensations as 
facts in need of demonstration by hypotheses about their causes. We prove the 
existence of an object by supposing it to be a cause of our sensations, but this 
supposition must be carefully verified. Gone is Turgot’s assurance that things 
9. “It necessarily follows, there is an omnipresent eternal Mind, which knows and compre-
hends all things, and exhibits them to our view in such a manner, and according to such 
rules as he himself hath ordained, and are by us termed the Laws of Nature” (Berkeley 2000 
[1710]: 220).
 Language as the Key to the Epistemological Labyrinth 353
just exist ‘out there’, while ideas adequately represent them. It is replaced by a 
scientific hypothesis concerning their probable existence, which must be scru-
pulously demonstrated. By adopting this method, Turgot associates the exis-
tence of external reality with all other domains in which suppositions, having 
to be matched and verified by given facts, function as explanatory principles 
— from physics to history. 
Turgot distinguishes between two types of demonstrations. There are cases 
in which the certainty of the cause is equal to that of the given fact (this applies, 
in his view, to God’s existence). In most instances, however, we have to search 
for the unknown causes of given effects, as is the case in proving the existence 
of external objects (537–538). 
L’autre manière de remonter des effets connus à la cause inconnue consiste 
à deviner la nature, précisément comme une énigme, à imaginer successi-
vement une ou plusieurs hypothèses, à les suivre dans leurs conséquences, 
à les comparer aux circonstances du phénomène, à les essayer sur les faits, 
comme on vérifie un cachet en l’appliquant sur son empreinte; ce sont là 
les fondements de l’art de déchiffrer, ce sont ceux de la critique des faits, 
ceux de la physique; et puisque ni les êtres extérieurs, ni les faits passés, 
n’ont avec la sensation actuelle aucune liaison dont la nécessité nous soit 
démontrée, ce sont aussi les seuls fondements possibles de toute certitude 
au sujet de l’existence des êtres extérieurs et de notre existence passée. 
The Encyclopédie entry ends by basing the existence of external objects and the 
permanence of the self on an inductive method, which is not infallible or cer-
tain but merely endowed with a high degree of probability. The same method 
is employed by Turgot to bestow a similar degree of certitude on etymological 
suppositions. Within his system, both tasks become experimental.
3.2 Etymology as experimental metaphysics
Turgot was not originally commissioned to compose the entry Étymologie 
for the Encyclopédie. The task had been assigned to André Morellet (1727–
1819), who edited a draft by Charles de Brosses (1707–1777) on the same topic. 
When asked to review the edited article, Turgot found it unsatisfactory and 
wrote his own entry, which triggered a debate over its authenticity.10 
10. Gustave Schelle (in Oeuvres de Turgot) and Maurice Piron (in Turgot — Étymologie) 
maintain that Turgot composed the article as a rather critical response to De Brosses’s. 
De Brosses himself wrote that Turgot had surely read his treatise and that they shared 
several views, but more generally, “Lorsque l’article de Turgot parut dans l’Encyclopédie,
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The methodological affinity between Étymologie and the way out of ‘the 
prison of immediate perceptions’ in Existence is manifest in Turgot’s instruc-
tions for the conduct of proper etymologies. The origin (primitif or étymologie) 
of a current word (dérivé) is an unknown cause which may be arrived at only by 
conjectures. Etymological investigations should be executed by the aid of two 
processes that complement each other: the invention of conjectures and their 
criticism or verification. Correspondingly, the article contains two main parts: 
Sources des conjectures étymologiques and Principes de critique pour apprécier 
la certitude des étymologies. Turgot’s scientific method and the meticulous at-
tention he paid to both the sources and the evaluation of historical-linguistic 
inquiries constitute the beginning of a modern concept of etymology. This is 
particularly apparent once Turgot’s method is compared with far-fetched sev-
enteenth-century inquiries into the history of words (some of which were un-
derlain by the hope of recovering a prelapsarian natural correspondence be-
tween words and things).11
Turgot points out that invention as a source of etymology has no strict 
rules and consists of intelligent guesses, also involving creativity and the exer-
cise of the imagination. He requires etymologists to immerse themselves in a 
‘nonchalant reverie’, a state of confusion where the mind contemplates a multi-
tude of pictures produced by a rapid fluctuation of ideas and their connections 
to each other (1913 [1756]: 478). But whereas the formation of etymological 
conjectures has to be creative, the art of criticism consists in the destruction of 
much of the imagination’s labor: assessing, balancing, reducing probabilities, 
and negating. The following distinction between three classes of etymologies 
je m’attendais à lire mon propre ouvrage; je trouvai une dissertation toute différente […] 
L’article Étymologie est à lui, mon traité est à moi” (quoted in Turgot 1913: 517). Luigi Rosi-
ello (1987) traced substantial differences between De Brosses’s and Turgot’s methods of ety-
mological research . 
11. An interesting exception in this regard is Leibniz. Asserting against Locke that significa-
tion is not entirely arbitrary and that there is ‘a certain natural source’ of languages, Leibniz 
nonetheless rejected contemporary wild etymologies conducted as part of a search for an 
original perfect language. His main principles of etymological research were somewhat sim-
ilar to Turgot’s. According to Leibniz, etymologies must be conducted continuously, with no 
leaps between distant languages (geographically or historically), and on the basis of a wide 
range of materials. Even so, they remain mere conjectures rather than immutable demon-
strations (see Aarsleff 1982 [1969]). For a fragment by Leibniz on the connection between 
words and things, see Dascal (1987: 189–190). 
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— certain, probable, and false — is supported by Turgot’s recommendation to 
exercise doubt frequently, as much as possible.12
Another resemblance between Turgot’s Existence and Étymologie is the 
avowed problematic task of definition. Turgot identifies two main types of mis-
takes in this domain. The first consists in defining a term according to only 
one of its accepted meanings; the second emerges in trying to avoid the first by 
searching for the common trait of all the possible significations of a word. Such 
an endeavor often yields a definition that does not include any distinct char-
acteristic of its object. Turgot postulates the impossibility of establishing ‘the 
most general sense’ of a word, supposedly including all its accepted meanings. 
This would be a futile enterprise due to the contingent character of significa-
tion (p. 510):
J’ose dire que presque toutes les définitions où l’on annonce qu’on va définir 
les choses dans le sens le plus général, ont ce défaut, et ne définissent véritable-
ment rien, parce que leurs auteurs, en voulant renfermer toutes les acceptions 
d’un mot, ont entrepris une chose impossible: je veux dire, de rassembler sous 
une seule idée générale des idées très différentes entre elles, et qu’un même 
mot n’a jamais pu désigner que successivement, en cessant en quelque sorte 
d’être le même mot. 
Once again, the quest for an adequate definition of abstract terms defeats itself 
or contains a real contradiction. Consequently, Turgot offers a notion of defini-
tion by usage: the sense of a word is regarded as an aggregate of all its accepted 
meanings, varying according to changes in its daily applications. 
Throughout the article, Turgot presents several unique views on etymology, 
which he treats as a comparative scientific study of languages, both synchronic-
ally and diachronically. The conduct of experimentally verifiable etymologies 
would hopefully contribute to the foundation of ‘a general theory of speech’ 
and ‘a philosophical history of the human spirit’. Both are to be carried out by 
genetically tracing ideas and their significations, mutual relations, changes in 
time, and correspondence to social, economic, and artistic factors (p. 506). 
12. In rule 20 of the critical method Turgot calms a possible fear of scepticism in a Carte-
sian manner: “On n’a point à craindre que ce doute produise une incertitude universelle; il 
y a, même dans le genre étymologique, des choses évidentes à leur manière; des dérivations 
si naturelles, qui portent un air de vérité si frappant, que peu de gens s’y refusent” (1913 
[1756]: 503). Nevertheless, Turgot does not supply any criterion for the distinction between 
‘regular’ etymologies and ‘naturally true’ ones; the appeal is to feeling and emotion. 
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N’y peut-il pas voir souvent la gradation qu’on a suivie dans le passage d’une 
idée à une autre et dans l’intervention de quelques arts et, par là, cette étude ne 
devient-elle pas une branche intéressante de la métaphysique expérimentale? 
Si ces détails sur les langues et les mots dont l’art étymologique s’occupe sont 
des grains de sable, il est précieux de les ramasser, puisque ce sont des grains 
de sable que l’esprit humain a jetés dans sa route, et qui peuvent seuls nous 
indiquer la trace de ses pas.
Turgot acknowledges his debt to Locke and Condillac, who pursued the mutual 
history of language and thought. Contemplating potential reasons for linguis-
tic change and variety, he describes a similar process to Maupertuis’s arbitrary 
“destination des signes aux différentes parties des perceptions”13 (p. 507):
Une des [difficultés] principales est l’espèce d’impossibilité où les hommes se 
trouvent de fixer exactement le sens des signes auxquels ils n’ont appris à lier 
des idées que par une habitude formée dans l’enfance, à force d’entendre ré-
péter les mêmes sons dans des circonstances semblables, mais qui ne le sont 
jamais entièrement; en sorte que, ni deux hommes, ni peut-être le même 
homme, dans des temps différents, n’attachent précisément au même mot 
la même idée. Les métaphores, multipliées par le besoin et par une espèce 
de luxe d’imagination, qui s’est aussi dans ce genre créé de faux besoins, ont 
compliqué de plus en plus les détours de ce labyrinthe immense, où l’homme, 
introduit, si j’ose ainsi parler, avant que ses yeux fussent ouverts, méconnaît sa 
route à chaque pas.
It is these circumstances that determine in each of us the meanings of words, 
and they differ among various men and women as well as between generations. 
Thus it seems that in the article Étymologie meaning is somewhat subject to the 
manner of perception, even if not as thoroughly as Maupertuis had suggested. 
Turgot forms a dynamic concept of human language, emphasizing the 
changes each language undergoes within itself apart from being influenced 
by constant exchange with other tongues. In a critique of linguistic purism, 
Turgot claims that all languages acquire new words daily (as apparent in his 
assertion that different people, sometimes even the same person, do not attach 
similar meanings to the same word under different circumstances). Following 
this notion of linguistic change, etymological conjectures may not be refuted 
on grounds of a missing correspondence to immutable first principles. Turgot 
does not wish to deduce abstract rules from a universal General Grammar but 
to examine languages experimentally for the discovery of these very rules. An 
13. Maupertuis (1971 [1740/1748]: 40).
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example of this approach is available in rule 17 for the verification of etymo-
logical suppositions (p. 501):
[…] Ne cherchons donc point à ramener à une loi fixe des variations mul-
tipliées à l’infini, dont les causes nous échappent: étudions-en seulement la 
succession comme on étudie les faits historiques.
Wishing to apply his experimental method only within a limited scope, Tur-
got rejects the possibility of an etymological supposition serving as a universal 
rule. Though etymologies might indicate continuous phenomena such as mi-
grations and commerce among nations, they are not capable of establishing 
isolated facts (p. 513): 
En général, des conjectures sur des noms me paraissent un fondement bien 
faible pour asseoir quelque assertion possitive; et, si je voulais faire usage 
de l’étymologie pour éclaircir les anciennes fables et le commencement de 
l’histoire des nations, ce serait bien moins pour élever que pour détruire. 
Turgot’s linguistic historicism, accompanied by his experimental method, led 
him to assert an additional notion — the socio-pragmatic aspect of linguistic 
change. Following his anti-purist convictions, Turgot asks his readers to refrain 
from the usual study of ancient languages in their perfect form, through texts 
written by distinguished authors. His experimental method should be applied 
to languages in their most corrupted states, as used by merchants and peddlers 
throughout the provinces. Only there may be found people who neglect gram-
matical rules for commercial utility and do not refuse to employ words merely 
due to their foreign origin.14 
This pragmatic awareness allows Turgot to emphasize the interplay be-
tween the producer and the receiver of linguistic signs. Being constantly occu-
pied with linguistic change, he writes that variations in pronunciation cannot 
be always attributed to the producer’s phonetic convenience (p. 501): 
Lorsqu’un mot, pour être transmis de génération en génération, passe d’un 
homme à l’autre, il faut qu’il soit entendu avant d’être répété; et, s’il est mal 
entendu, il sera mal répété: voilà deux organes et deux sources d’altération.
The new methodological outlook of etymology makes it a useful tool not only for 
historical and linguistic research but also for literary criticism of philosophical 
14. “C’est le peuple grossier qui a le plus contribué à la formation de nouveaux langages 
[…]. C’est toujours par le bas peuple que commence le langage mitoyen qui s’établit néces-
sairement entre deux nations” (Turgot 1913 [1756]: 480–481). 
358 Avi S. Lifschitz
essays, folk tales, Biblical stories, and myths of creation and foundation. Armed 
with critical zeal and mindful of false etiologies, Turgot makes several interest-
ing observations, for example on the occasional invention of a hero’s proper 
name after the already-existing name of the city he had allegedly founded. Such 
inventions occur, according to Turgot, ‘in order to fill up the gaps that history 
always leaves open regarding the genesis of peoples’; his new etymological sci-
ence might clarify these cases (p. 515). 
Turgot’s Étymologie thus exhibits an innovative approach to the study of 
language in both its pragmatic/historical sensitivity and the employment of 
probable causality. It offers historians of language a synthetic point of view, 
recognizing constant tensions in two axes: the dialectics of language universals 
and linguistic variety, and that of the origin of language versus its develop-
ment. 
4. Contemporary context: Reassessing Berkeley’s challenge 
The change Turgot’s views underwent in the beginning of the 1750s may 
have been influenced by parallel theoretical developments in the writings of 
significant philosophes such as Condillac and Diderot. Both of them, as well 
as Turgot, exemplified a positive reevaluation of some of the tenets of Berke-
ley’s immaterialism (though by no means most or all of them).15 Having been 
frequently dismissed as unattainable by an appeal to common sense until the 
1740s, Berkeley’s system was reassessed as an invigorating challenge to sensu-
alist philosophy in the tradition of Locke. Though some of the philosophes still 
succumbed to the old manner of ridiculing Berkeley (like Voltaire in the article 
Corps in his Dictionnaire philosophique),16 others appreciated the relevance of 
Berkeley’s works to their own philosophy (Diderot and Condillac). 
Berkeley had shown in his Essay Towards a New Theory of Vision (1709; 
first translation into French in 1734) that the visual images of certain objects 
are completely distinct from tactile perceptions of the same items (2000 [1709]: 
54). Thus, one sense cannot reaffirm what another perceives, contrary to Tur-
got’s initial trust in the compatibility of data received through different senses 
15. On the general attitude towards Berkeley’s works until the 1730s, see Bracken (1965). 
Richard Popkin claims that Berkeley played a more significant role than Hume in the phi-
losophes’ theories of knowledge, even if as a negative example to be avoided. On the multi-
faceted image of Berkeley in the French Enlightenment, see Popkin (1997). 
16. Voltaire called Berkeley’s system ridiculous, blamed Berkeley for “cent sophismes cap-
tieux” and finally declared: “Le paradoxe de Berklay [sic] ne vaut pas la peine d’être réfuté” 
(1994 [1752]: 644–645).
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and their origin in a single external object. The ensuing conclusion, that percep-
tion varies according to the number and soundness of the senses, was reiterated 
in Berkeley’s Three Dialogues between Hylas and Philonous.17 The discrepancies 
between the senses and the possibility of qualitatively different inputs, medi-
ated only by habit and experience, raised crucial questions: if there were no 
ideas common to sight and touch, the final perceptions produced from the data 
these senses provide might be contingent. The growing interest in the implica-
tions of Berkeley’s theory of knowledge may explain Maupertuis’s and Turgot’s 
move from definitions and linguistic analysis of perception to questioning the 
adequacy of human cognition and its congruence with external reality. 
Diderot incorporated Berkeley’s observations into his Lettre sur les aveugles 
à l’usage de ceux qui voient (1749), pointing out that the human cognitive map 
is modeled after contingent manners of perception, which may vary among 
impaired people. He took Berkeley’s observations on vision to their farthest 
logical consequence (which cost him an incarceration in Vincennes): a denial 
of the distinct existence of distance, size, and space independently of the per-
ceiving eye implied the relativity of man’s entire perception of the universe, in-
cluding time, morals, religion, and history. The lack of a substructure common 
to all senses was aggravated by the problem of empiricist representation (one 
of the main targets of the Berkeleyan assault).18 
In his early critiques of Berkeley and Maupertuis (1750), Turgot held the 
opposite view to that of Diderot and Berkeley, affirming the common sub-
structure of all senses and the compatibility of their data concerning external 
reality. 
17. “Hence it follows that when I examine by my other senses a thing I have seen, it is not in 
order to understand better the same object which I had perceived by sight, the object of one 
sense not being perceived by the other senses” (Berkeley 2000 [1713]: 235). 
18. The much-debated existence of a substructure common to all senses is inextricably 
linked to the Molyneux problem. William Molyneux (1656–1698), an Irish scientist and 
lawyer, asked Locke in two letters (1688, 1693) whether a man born blind, able to distinguish 
a ball from a cube by touch, would discern the one from the other without touching them 
once his eyesight is restored to him. Locke adopted Molyneux’s negative answer, claiming 
that only experience would teach the blind to coordinate his tactile and visual sensations. 
This opinion was shared by Berkeley, Voltaire, and Maupertuis and opposed by Condillac 
and Turgot (at least in their works written before 1751). Turgot confirmed the view that all 
sense data are ultimately compatible by declaring Locke’s solution of the Molyneux problem 
to be ‘false, even very false’ (1971 [1750]: 81). 
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Comment prouvera-t-il [Berkeley] que cet être existant hors de nous, cette 
cause de nos sensations, ce centre commun où elles aboutissent et que tous les 
hommes appellent matière n’existe pas? Je n’entreprendrai point de le réfuter; 
je vous indiquerai seulement mes principes. Je porte la main sur un objet, je 
sens une résistance et j’en ai idée par le tact; en même temps, je vois ma main 
s’avancer vers cet objet que mes yeux me montraient déjà; c’est par le secours 
de mes yeux que je guide ma main; je la vois s’appliquer à l’objet, qui par là est 
une cause commune de mes deux sensations qui n’auront nul rapport si ma 
main n’existe que dans mon idée. (1913 [1750]: 186)
This view is diametrically opposed to the one Turgot adhered to in 1756, when 
he demonstrated that neither vision nor touch are sufficiently reliable in prov-
ing the existence of external objects (1913 [1756]: 534–535). 
Mais comment la sensation pourrait-elle être immédiatement et par elle-
même un témoignage de la présence des corps, puisqu’elle n’est pas le corps, et 
surtout puisque l’expérience nous montre tous les jours des occasions où cette 
sensation existe sans le corps?19
Diderot used such observations in 1749 against Condillac’s confidence in the 
existence of external objects, declaring Condillac to be a Berkeleyan imma-
terialist malgré lui or otherwise guilty of inconsistency. Thus Diderot recom-
mended that Condillac read Berkeley’s Three Dialogues:
On appelle idéalistes ces philosophes qui, n’ayant conscience que de leur exis-
tence et des sensations qui se succèdent au-dedans d’eux-mêmes, n’admettent 
pas autre chose: système extravagante, qui ne pouvait, ce me semble, devoir 
sa naissance qu’à des aveugles; système qui, à la honte de l’esprit humain et 
de la philosophie, est le plus difficile à combattre, quoique le plus absurde de 
tous. Il est exposé avec autant de franchise que de clarté dans trois Dialogues 
du docteur Berkeley, évêque de Cloyne; il faudrait inviter l’auteur de l’Essai sur 
nos connaissances [Condillac] à examiner cet ouvrage: il y trouverait matière à 
des observations utiles, agréables, fines, et telles en un mot qu’il les sait faire. 
L’idéalisme mérite bien de lui être dénoncé; et cette hypothèse a de quoi le pi-
quer moins encore par sa singularité, que par la difficulté de la réfuter dans ses 
principes; car ce sont précisément les mêmes que ceux de Berkeley (Diderot 
2000 [1749]: 56).20 
19. This question is followed by a detailed examination of the failure of both vision and 
touch to assure us of the existence of external bodies. 
20. Taking Diderot’s remark and Berkeley’s ‘agreeable and fine observations’ into account, 
Condillac modified some of his earlier opinions in the Traité des sensations of 1754. In his 
Essai of 1746 Condillac was convinced that vision and touch do correspond to each other,
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According to Diderot’s and Condillac’s adjusted view, external reality is not 
perceived directly through unmediated sensations. Sense data are compared 
and juxtaposed, thereby ‘instructing’ the mind how to form a unified picture of 
the world. Diderot and Concillac were not the only ones to take Berkeley’s sys-
tem more seriously than their predecessors; in his Encyclopédie entry Existence 
Turgot advocated a reevaluation of Berkeley, praising rather than condemning 
him for having authored ‘ridiculous’, ‘obscure’, and ‘bizarre’ works (Turgot 1913 
[1756]: 534): 
C’est le célèbre évêque de Cloyne, le docteur Berkeley, connu par un grand 
nombre d’ouvrages, tous remplis d’esprit et d’idées singulières, qui, par ses 
dialogues d’Hylas et de Philonoüs [sic], a, dans ces derniers temps, réveillé 
l’attention des métaphysiciens sur ce système oublié [immaterialism]. La plu-
part ont trouvé plus court de le mépriser que de lui répondre, et cela était en 
effet plus aisé.
Turgot did not explicitly mention, however, that he himself was among those 
who found it easy enough to deride ‘the famous Bishop’ only a few years earlier 
(though unlike other critics, he did bother to respond to Berkeley’s works at 
relative length). 
5. Conclusion
The modification of Turgot’s epistemological views, including a serious ex-
amination of Berkeleyan immaterialism, occurred at the same time Condillac 
and Diderot began to reassess Berkeley’s system. Moreover, the only work by 
Berkeley Turgot explicitly referred to in 1756, Three Dialogues between Hylas 
and Philonous, was first translated into French in 1750 by one of Diderot’s ac-
quaintances, the Abbé Gua de Malves.21 It would be beyond the confines of 
this paper to trace a direct influence of this translation upon the reevaluation 
of Berkeley’s system by the philosophes, partly since Diderot (unlike Condil-
lac) read English fluently and referred to the Dialogues already in his Lettre sur 
les aveugles of 1749. However, I would like to suggest that the change Turgot’s 
sharing fundamental ideas that ‘cannot be represented in different ways’. The assertion that 
all senses perceive the same basic ideas of extension was abandoned in the Traité in favor 
of an instructive-experimental method, closer to Diderot’s insights of 1749, in which one 
learns how to perceive. 
21. Dialogues entre Hylas et Philonous, published in Amsterdam in 1750 (see Jessop 1968: 
27). Jean Paul de Gua de Malves (1712–1786) served as editor of the Encyclopédie before the 
project was entrusted to Diderot and d’Alembert.
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views underwent in the 1750s epitomizes a gradual revision in France of com-
mon prejudices concerning the alleged superficiality of Berkeley’s works. The 
recognition of Berkeley’s challenge to sensualist epistemology was accompa-
nied by an emphasis on the unique role of language as the medium through 
which human knowledge developed and a mediator between incommensu-
rable channels of perception. Turgot’s articles in the Encyclopédie acknowledge 
the significance of linguistic terms and definitions, while arguing that in both 
epistemology and the study of language probable but well-examined hypoth-
eses should be preferred to dogmatic convictions. 
However suggestive these facts are, one has to be cautious. It may be that 
Turgot was undergoing a spontaneous course of intellectual development at 
the beginning of the 1750s; he was barely twenty-three upon writing his cri-
tiques of Maupertuis and Berkeley. Its underlying reasons notwithstanding, the 
apparent change in Turgot’s epistemology was long lasting. The dilemma of 
sensualist epistemology — how we know the sources of perceptions, if all we 
have access to are mere sense data — continued to haunt Turgot for many years 
thereafter. As Condorcet recounted in 1784, ‘Turgot frequently used to say that 
anyone who did not regard the existence of external objects as a difficult ques-
tion, one that merits occupying our curiosity, would never make any progress 
in metaphysics.’22 
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SUMMARY
A belief in a firm correspondence between objects, ideas, and their rep-
resentation in language pervaded the works of Anne Robert Jacques Turgot 
(1727–1781) in 1750. This conviction is particularly manifest in Turgot’s sharp 
critique of Berkeley’s philosophical system and his remarks on Maupertuis’s 
reconstruction of the origin of language. During the 1750s Turgot’s episte-
mological views underwent a change, apparent in two of his contributions to 
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the Encyclopédie: the entries Existence and Étymologie (1756). These articles 
included a reassessment of Berkeleyan immaterialism, facing an ultimate cri-
sis of definition and representation. A similar development may be traced in 
contemporary works by Condillac and Diderot. Turgot’s Encyclopédie entries 
also envisaged a new science, an archeology of the human mind aided by the 
examination of linguistic development and change. This entailed the scientific 
verification of conjectures in any historical account of ideas, turning etymo-
logical and psychological inquiries into what Turgot termed ‘experimental 
metaphysics’.
RÉSUMÉ
La croyance en une correspondance nette entre les objets, les idées, et leur 
représentation dans le domaine du langage imprégna les oeuvres d’Anne Robert 
Jacques Turgot (1727–1781) en 1750. Cette conviction se retrouve clairement 
dans la critique que fit Turgot sur le système philosophique de Berkeley, ainsi 
que dans ses remarques sur la tentative faite par Maupertuis de reconstruire 
l’origine des langues. Au cours des années 1750 les opinions épistémologiques 
de Turgot subirent une modification, évidente dans deux de ses contributions 
à l’Encyclopédie: les articles Existence et Étymologie (1756). Dans ces articles 
s’intégrait une évaluation nouvelle de l’immatérialisme de Berkeley, face à une 
crise finale portant sur la définition et la représentation. Un développement 
analogue se laisse percevoir dans des oeuvres contemporaines par Condillac et 
Diderot. Les articles de Turgot dans l’Encyclopédie envisageaient également une 
nouvelle science, une archéologie de l’esprit humain, qu’aiderait l’examen du 
développement et du changement linguistiques. Il devait en résulter la vérifica-
tion scientifique de conjectures dans tout exposé d’ordre historique, transfor-
mant les enquêtes étymologiques et psychologiques en ce que Turgot qualifia 
de «métaphysique expérimentale».
ZUSAMMENFASSUNG
Der Glaube an einen engen Zusammenhang zwischen Objekten, Ideen und 
ihrer sprachlichen Darstellung durchzog die Werke von Anne Robert Jacques 
Turgot (1727–1781) im Jahre 1750. Diese Überzeugung tritt besonders deut-
lich hervor in Turgots scharfer Kritik an Berkeleys philosophischem System 
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sowie in seinen Bemerkungen zu Maupertuis’ Rekonstruktionsversuch des 
Sprachursprungs. In den fünfziger Jahren des 18. Jahrhunderts wandelte sich 
Turgots Sicht der Dinge, was an zwei seiner Beiträge zur Encyclopédie deutlich 
wird: an den Einträgen Existence und Étymologie (1756). Diese Artikel unter-
nahmen den Versuch einer Neubewertung von Berkeleys Immaterialismus 
und traten einer letzten Krise der Definitions- und Repräsentationsversuche 
entgegen. Eine ähnliche Entwicklung ließe sich in zeitgenössischen Werken 
von Condillac und Diderot aufzeigen. Turgots Encyclopédie-Einträge zielten 
auch auf die Schaffung einer neuen Wissenschaft ab, auf eine Archäologie des 
menschlichen Geistes, welche durch die Untersuchung von Sprachentwicklung 
und Sprachwandel befördert wurde. Dies zog die wissenschaftliche Überprü-
fung von Konjekturen in allen historischen Darstellungen von Ideen nach sich 
und bewirkte so den Übergang von etymologischen und psychologischen Un-
tersuchungen zu dem, was Turgot „experimentelle Metaphysik“ nannte.
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